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In Bernanke We Trust

The Fed chair came out from under Alan Greenspan’s shadow with a bold rate cut that may have prevented a recession. What’s Hank Paulson waiting for?


Illustration by Marc Boutavant  

Talk about pressure! Talk about crummy timing for a book tour! Two days before the most important Federal Reserve meeting in a decade, Ben Bernanke, the rookie Fed chairman, had to listen to the national icon, his predecessor, Alan Greenspan, hawk his new book, The Age of Turbulence, in virtually every venue on earth, replete with a main story line about how great he is and how clueless everyone else is about monetary policy in the United States.

The last thing Bernanke—under intense pressure to slash interest rates to save the credit markets—needed to hear was the Oracular One talking about how reining in inflation with high interest rates is job number one for whoever sits on the Fed throne, and how Greenspan deserved immense credit for doing just that. Maybe Greenspan accomplished what he wanted—a spit-polished legacy, the top spot on Amazon, and a huge boost to his consulting business—but he cast an avuncular shadow so gigantic and dark over the new guy that it’s a wonder Bernanke could even find his way to the Federal Reserve building for last Tuesday’s meeting.

Could it be that Bernanke had the former Fed chief’s 60 Minutes interview on mute? Or maybe Bernanke realized the true gravity of what was shaping up to be the worst credit crisis since Citigroup almost went belly-up in 1990 and chose not to heed the long-term advice of the sainted one. Whatever the reason, the rookie shook off the Greenspan shroud and hit the ball out of the park with a fat half-point cut in the federal funds rate. Because of Bernanke’s bold move—the half-point cut was twice as deep as most Fed followers, including yours truly, who had been a vocal critic of the Fed’s stewardship, had expected—I’m now confident that what would have been a given in 2008, a brutal recession that started with housing but was spreading, Ebola-like, to the rest of the economy, will now be avoided and prosperity assured. What a save!

What was Bernanke saving us from? What caused the mess that forced him to take drastic action, not one of those itty-bitty quarter-point interest-rate jobs? How about a chaotic, frozen, dysfunctional economy fueled by defaulting mortgages based on irresponsible teaser rates that his predecessor pushed hard and often for every prospective home buyer to take, including those who could ill afford them? Where’s that in the book? And then, after hooking millions of unqualified buyers to take low-interest teasers that would reset in two years, Greenspan gaffed the borrowers with fourteen straight interest-rate hikes that put the reset mortgage rates out of reach for all but the wealthiest. Those vicious and, I believe, foreseeable resets—foreseeable if you are going to set the rates, as Greenspan did—are causing a national wave of defaults the likes of which haven’t been seen since the Great Depression. And why did Mr. Prudent champion these reckless teasers almost as heavily as the endless Ditech and Countrywide television pitchmen who buried us in these adjustable-rate nooses did? Because he needed to work his way out of the dot-com crash by stoking the housing market. And what had caused the dot-com bubble? That would be the low margin rates that fueled ridiculous speculation in junk stocks—rates controlled by, you guessed it, our lovable hero, Alan Greenspan. At any given time the author of The Age of Turbulence could have prevented, well, the Age of Turbulence, by simply raising margin rates, by discouraging the use of exotic teaser mortgages, and by encouraging regulations that would have ended the travesty of giving money to speculators to flip houses. But Greenspan, an acolyte of libertarian Ayn Rand, disdains regulations. Instead, he seemed to like the power and mystery of endlessly taking rates up and down, disrupting the whole economy instead of managing discrete stock-market or house-speculation bubbles. Just a little regulation could have avoided both of those bubbles, with no need to overstimulate and then wreck the overall economy with crushing rate increases like the ones with which Greenspan stuck Bernanke.

Bernanke wasn’t just up against Greenspan’s blinding halo last week. He was also up against President Bush and the man in charge of Bush’s management of the economy, Hank Paulson. Despite the record mortgage defaults, despite more than 100 mortgage brokers’ going under, despite multiple bailouts of the largest lender in the country, Countrywide, and despite an actual loss of jobs in August, Bush and Paulson on virtually every occasion trumpeted that the “fundamentals are sound.” That bullish claptrap put Bernanke in the incredibly awkward position of having to cut rates even as the president and his Treasury secretary proclaimed boom times. Blessedly, Bernanke, after a slow start during which he hiked rates himself only to have to flip-flop when he saw the possibility of runs on banks in this country and no credit to buy almost anything larger than a shanty, managed to shake off the Hoover-like assurances of the president and the Treasury secretary and recognize that the fundamentals were anything but sound.


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