Consequently, when Arafat ended the negotiations by walking out, Barak quickly shifted gears and began trying to sell the Israeli public on the idea of a fence to achieve separation. If it couldn’t be done through negotiation, he argued, then it needed to be done unilaterally.

It has been lost in most of the recent debate over the fence that the idea was originally embraced by Israel’s left. The right was opposed to the fence for precisely the same reason as the Palestinians—because they knew it would create a virtual border. This means two critical things: a de facto Palestinian state and the likely abandonment of at least some of the settlements.

Nevertheless, Israel’s politicians, even those on the pragmatic right (as opposed to the religious right), have begun to recognize what the public is clamoring for. “People in politics don’t do what they want, they do what they must,” says Schueftan, who has been telling the leading members of Israel’s right for five years that eventually they would have to accept and implement disengagement.

“The Israeli public wants to be completely cut off from the Palestinians,” he says, “and as a result nobody can be prime minister without going in this direction. It’s not even an option if they want to stay in power.”

More and more politicians have also begun to recognize the time imperative. Stalling, muddling along, or simply waiting for the Palestinians to negotiate could very well result in the end of the Jewish state.

These notions have penetrated so far into Israeli society that even Ariel Sharon knows he must respond. The grand designer and builder of the settlements, the fervent believer in the “greater land of Israel,” is talking for the first time about unilateral steps to leave at least part of the West Bank and Gaza and, in the process, give up some of the settlements.

Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, the former mayor of Jerusalem and one of Sharon’s closest allies, has gone even further, openly expressing his concern about maintaining a Jewish majority in Israel if it doesn’t give up almost all of the territories. The demographic arithmetic is pretty simple. Right now, there are 3.2 million Palestinians living in the territories. Israel’s population is 6.3 million, which includes the more than 1 million Arabs who are Israeli citizens (but doesn’t, of course, include the Palestinians).

In other words, of the more than 9 million people living in Israel and the territories, roughly 55 percent are Jewish and 45 percent are Arab. But based on population-growth rates, these percentages will be reversed by 2020.

“We are approaching a point,” Olmert has said, “where more and more Palestinians will say: ‘There is no place for two states between the Jordan and the sea. All we want is the right to vote.’ The day they get it, we will lose everything.”

In fact, Palestinian prime minister Ahmed Qureia recently warned that if something doesn’t happen to break the deadlock soon, Palestinians may change their strategy and simply start asking for the vote in Israel. Though no one on the Israeli side thought he actually meant it (at least not yet), and his own people weren’t happy about his playing this card, the message was clear: The Palestinians may be suffering, but time is not on Israel’s side.

Much of the always raucous public debate in Israel is currently focused on Sharon’s intentions. He has said that if there’s no progress with the Palestinians in the next few months, he will consider unilateral steps. Is he serious about this or is he just trying to buy time? Is he hoping that once the presidential race in America really heats up, the Bush administration will be too distracted to pay attention to what he is doing?

Yossi Alpher does not believe Sharon will dismantle a single settlement. He argues that the prime minister is still intent, as he has been for twenty years, on compelling the Palestinians to accept a state on only 50 percent of the West Bank, with Israel maintaining permanent control over the Jordan Valley.

Alpher believes Sharon may simply be buying time. His approval ratings are way down, he is facing potential legal difficulties over a bribe scandal, and he has also been hurt recently when several high-ranking military and intelligence officers publically denounced the failed policies of the past several years. “Sharon knows he has to do something to reposition himself in the center,” Alpher says, “but he’s very fortunate that his political opposition is in complete disarray.”

Schueftan, on the other hand, is not interested in what Sharon wants. “I’m not his mother,” says Schueftan, who knows the prime minister well. “And what he truly wants deep in his heart is a matter for his cardiologist. I’m only interested in what he’s doing. And what he’s doing is sending the message to the mainstream Israeli public that ‘I, Ariel Sharon, the great builder of the settlements, am heading in the direction of dismantling them.’ This is of historical significance.”

In the 37 years israel has controlled the West Bank and Gaza, 144 settlements have been built, and they are now officially home to 237,000 people (there are, however, many unoccupied residences, and the number of people actually physically living in the settlements is probably closer to 185,000). The purpose of the settlements was to make it difficult, if not impossible, for Israel to give back the West Bank and Gaza. And their existence creates two substantial obstacles to separation: one practical and one ideological.

The practical issue, though difficult, is not, despite what it might seem, insurmountable. Just about half of all the settlers live in six towns: Ariel, Efrat, Giv’at Ze’ev, Betar ’Illit, Ma’ale Adummim, and Modi’in Illit.