Microsoft's core business, in other words, is attitude -- nationalism on a corporate level. (Propagating an operating system is the equivalent of war.)

The difference, therefore, between Microsoft and Standard Oil or AT&T or IBM is that in its antitrust battle with the Justice Department, Microsoft has been defending not just stockholder value and executive fiefdoms but a way of life. A philosophy. A reason for being. Even a place -- the near-autonomous state of Redmond. Indeed, my guess is that the trial, and Microsoft's puzzling obstinacy, has, in the end, strengthened rather than weakened Microsoft culture (if Microsoft culture has been weakened by anything, it's the attraction of dot-com wealth, which is even greater than Microsoft wealth, and dot-com jihad-ness, which is even more warriorlike, but that is another story).

The point, which Microsoft seems clearly to understand (either strategically or instinctively), is that it would hardly be very smart to settle or compromise when you're running a holy war. Martyrdom, if you analyze the economic benefits of devotion, beats compromise.

Which is part of the continuing disconnect here for the objective, old-world observer. This case could have been settled long ago; this case could have been settled far short of the remedies Microsoft is now facing. Indeed, Microsoft could even have accepted what it has made the Maginot Line of the dispute -- the linking or de-linking of browser to operating system -- with minimal consequences to its business.

But it held, willfully and blindly risking the farm.

This, then, is either one spectacular act of capitalist self-destruction (finally Marx is proved right), or, contrarily, these guys have something really crafty up their sleeves and know exactly what they're doing.

Certainly the stock market, over the course of last week, appeared to think so. If, during the trial, we have seen Microsoft stay resolutely in character -- "we are absolutely right, you are absolutely wrong; we represent the future economic health of the nation, you would risk all that" -- then why should they be expected to cut and run now? As likely, they will do what Microsoft does.

After all, these guys are not only son-of-a-bitch business guys and technology holy warriors but great (among the greatest) game players. This aspect of the Microsoft character has been hidden by Microsoft's ill temper and sullenness during the trial (who knows if this wasn't by design?). But everyone who has ever done any kind of business with Microsoft knows that its method (Machiavellian, Bismarckian, Nixonian) is to trick the other fellow (a "history of mischief and perfidy," as Ralph Nader put it the other day).

The company is founded on a trick, remember -- it persuaded IBM to fill its PCs with an operating system that Microsoft would continue to own (this Trojan-horse move today represents the zenith of business accomplishment; all companies either aspire to it or frantically try to protect against it).

More than anyone else, Microsoft understands, even epitomizes, the most coldhearted business principle: You only make money (real money) off people who are weaker than you or stupider than you. And very often, conveniently, the people who are stronger than you are stupider too.

As we enter into the final settlement period, Microsoft, in many ways, comes into its own. This is what these guys live for. This is the Microsoft sweet spot. If you're weaker, they merely squeeze you harder. If you're stronger, they outwit you.

It is worth noting that, going into this phase, Gates, the religious figure, the imam, is receding, and Ballmer, the real game player, the negotiator, the politician, is stepping forward.